Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Supreme Court Briefs

Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law

2019

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gallagher v. Diocese of Palm Beach,
Inc.
Leslie C. Griffin
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Marci A. Hamilton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/scotusbriefs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gallagher v. Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc., No. 18-964 (Feb. 21, 2019) (with
Marci A. Hamilton).

This Supreme Court Brief is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional
repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more
information, please contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

No. 18-964
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
-----------------------------------------------------------------FATHER JOHN GALLAGHER,
Petitioner,
v.
DIOCESE OF PALM BEACH, INC.,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Florida District Court Of Appeal
For The Fourth District
-----------------------------------------------------------------MOTION OF CHILD USA FOR LEAVE TO FILE
A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER AND BRIEF OF CHILD USA AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
-----------------------------------------------------------------MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
CEO & Academic Director
CHILD USA
Robert A. Fox Professor
of Practice
University of Pennsylvania
3814 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 539-1906
marcih@sas.upenn.edu

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
Director of Amicus
Advocacy
CHILD USA
3701 Chestnut St.,
6th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(713) 301-3105
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu

================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

1
MOTION OF CHILD USA FOR LEAVE
TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
Pursuant to Rule 37.2(b), CHILD USA respectfully moves for permission to file the attached brief
amicus curiae. Petitioner has consented to CHILD
USA’s filing of a brief. In accordance with Rule 37.2(a),
CHILD USA has provided notice to Counsel for Respondent of CHILD USA’s intent to file a brief. Mark
E. Chopko, Counsel for the Diocese of Palm Beach, refused consent to CHILD USA’s filing.
CHILD USA, the Think Tank for Child Protection,
is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit think tank that conducts evidence-based legal, medical, and social science research
to identify, impact, and inform the laws and policies affecting child protection in the United States. With
these facts, CHILD USA is able to promote ideas, and
propose effective policy solutions that work to protect
kids from abuse and prevent childhood neglect. CHILD
USA draws on the combined expertise of the nation’s
leading medical and legal academics to reach evidencebased solutions to the persistent and widespread epidemic of child abuse.
Sexual abuse and the maltreatment of children
have an all too frequent impact on children’s health
and well-being. Every day, millions of children’s civil
rights are violated in the United States, and due to the
continued existence of certain statutes of limitations,
the statutes that are meant to protect them may have
the perverse effect of protecting only the perpetrator.
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Although these offenses may occur in secret, behind
closed doors, they have devastating public consequences for victims, their families, and the public, in
some cases lasting decades after the violence ends.
CHILD USA cuts through the shame and secrecy to
gather and analyze the data behind this type of abuse
and neglect. All child victims deserve justice, and it is
CHILD USA’s mission to find a path for them to
achieve it.
We therefore ask this Court to grant certiorari in
this case and to identify a child-protective rule that
keeps children from harm.
Respectfully submitted,
MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
CEO & Academic Director
CHILD USA
Robert A. Fox Professor of Practice
University of Pennsylvania
3814 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 539-1906
marcih@sas.upenn.edu
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
Director of Amicus Advocacy
CHILD USA
3701 Chestnut St., 6th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(713) 301-3105
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
With the written consent of the Petitioner filed
with the Clerk of the Court, CHILD USA, respectfully
submits this brief as amicus curiae.1 Amicus has
moved to have this Court accept this brief without the
consent of the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae, CHILD USA, conducts evidencebased legal, medical, and social science research to improve the laws and policies affecting child protection.
In addition to research, CHILD USA compiles evidence, promotes ideas, and proposes the most effective
policies to prevent childhood abuse and neglect. With
these facts, CHILD USA shines a light on the best
ways to truly protect all children from abuse and neglect. Sexual abuse and the maltreatment of children
have an all too-frequent impact on children’s health.
These acts often occur in secret, behind closed doors,
but have public consequences. Victims, their families,
and the public pay a high price even decades after the
violence ends. CHILD USA cuts through the shame
1

Counsel for amicus curiae authored this brief in whole and
no other person or entity other than amicus or their counsel has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Counsel for both parties were given ten days notice.
Petitioner granted consent. We move to have this Brief admitted
by this Court without Respondent’s consent.
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and the secrecy to gather and analyze the data behind
abuse and neglect.
CHILD USA draws on the combined expertise of
the nation’s leading medical and legal academics to
reach evidence-based solutions to persistent and widespread child abuse and neglect. All child victims deserve justice, and it is CHILD USA’s mission to find a
path for them to achieve it.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court needs to state again that religious freedom does not protect tortious conduct. Father John
Gallagher reported a priest, who showed a minor pornographic pictures, to the state police. The offending
priest was subsequently convicted and deported.
Instead of celebrating this heroic act of child protection, Gallagher’s diocese punished him, publishing
numerous defamatory statements about him. The trial
court would have heard Gallagher’s defamation lawsuit against the diocese. The Florida appeals court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that a mix of church
autonomy, ecclesiastical abstention, and the ministerial exception barred the case from being heard.
Amicus repeatedly and frequently protects children from abuse by religious and non-religious actors.
Many religious actors hide their wrongdoing instead of
revealing this abuse. This Court should grant certiorari to remind the nation’s courts that religious
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freedom does not protect illegal conduct like defamation. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This defamation
case should be decided according to neutral principles
of law.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
Father John Gallagher correctly reported his new
assistant priest, Father Joseph Palimatton, to the
Palm Beach County sheriff ’s office after discovering
that Father Palimatton had shown pornographic pictures to a 14-year-old boy. Father Palimatton pled
guilty to possessing and showing pornography to a minor and was deported to India. Diocese of Palm Beach,
Inc. v. Gallagher, 249 So. 3d 657, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018), review denied, No. SC18-865, 2018 WL 4050485
(Fla. Aug. 23, 2018).
There is no question that Father Gallagher correctly identified a criminal to the police and, as a result, protected other children from abuse by
Palimatton. Florida police even praised Father Gallagher’s valuable work on the Palimatton case. One
sheriff wrote a letter to Sean Cardinal O’Malley, stating, “Father Gallagher, immediately, took the steps to
hold the individual responsible and defer any further
crime that might have been perpetrated against other
children in the congregation.” App. to Pet. Cert. 52a.
Instead of celebrating Father Gallagher as a brave
whistleblower who had exposed a wrongdoer and kept
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more children from harm, the Palm Beach Diocese
punished him and tried to cover up Palimatton’s crime.
In response, Father Gallagher alleged that the diocese
had defamed him in numerous ways, including in news
stories in Florida newspapers and social media posts.
The Florida trial court properly rejected the diocese’s ecclesiastical abstention defense, ruling that the
defamation lawsuit “could be resolved based on neutral legal principles without entangling the courts in
the interpretation and application of church law, policies, and practices.” Id. at 658-59. The Florida appeals
court, however, incorrectly granted the diocese’s writ of
prohibition. It concluded that the case “cannot be resolved without the courts excessively entangling themselves in what is essentially a religious dispute.” Id. at
659. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. Gallagher v. Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc., No. SC18-865,
2018 WL 4050485 (Fla. Aug. 23, 2018).
This case is not a religious dispute. It is a neutral
legal dispute between religious actors. It is a case
about the protection of children. State and federal
prosecutors, judges, and legislators have increasingly
recognized the need to protect children from religious
wrongdoers, whether they are ministers who abuse
children or their superiors who work to systematically
conceal the misconduct from police. See, e.g., In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d
712 (Pa. 2018). Across the country, thousands of children are in danger of abuse by these types of offenders
whose misconduct may take decades to reveal, a lapse
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in time that is only amplified by systemic employer
cover-ups. Id.
This Court should grant certiorari in this case to
clarify that religious freedom does not authorize religious organizations to defame their brave employees
who protect children from harm. Father Gallagher’s
lawsuit involves defamatory statements published
outside the church, not related to church doctrine, and
implicating matters of public safety. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i, Gallagher v. Diocese of Palm
Beach, No. 18-964, 2019 WL 338905 (Jan. 25, 2019).
Consequently, it is of vital importance that this Court
clarify the law, thereby encouraging other ministers to
come forward and not remain silent for fear of retaliation from their religious employers. As an organization
devoted to the protection of children’s well-being, we
urge this Court to allow this case to go to trial based
on neutral principles of law.
I.

This Case Should Be Resolved According
to Neutral Principles of Law.

This Court has long argued that religious actors
are required to obey neutral laws because the rule of
law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res.
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court
should clarify that the neutral principles of law standard applies to tort cases. Consistent with this Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, state and federal
courts have abstained from hearing cases under the
“ecclesiastical abstention rule” only when the dispute
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cannot be resolved according to neutral principles of
law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary,
426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) (“Secular courts may,
however, have jurisdiction over a case involving a
church if ‘neutral principles of law’ can be applied in
reaching the resolution.”). For this reason, courts allow
lawsuits against a Christian seminary to proceed because the litigation can be resolved according to neutral, non-religious principles of law, just like
Petitioner’s case here. Id. at 615. See also Galetti v.
Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when
tort and contract claims can be “ ‘resolved by the application of purely neutral principles of law and without
impermissible government intrusion . . . there is no
First Amendment shield to litigation’ ”) (quoting
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 852 (N.J. 2002)) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
Respondent and the Florida appeals court mischaracterized Petitioner’s case as a purely religious
dispute that the courts cannot adjudicate. The court
concluded the case was a matter of church autonomy
and ecclesiastical abstention, even though this Court
has never identified church autonomy as the proper
theory of the First Amendment. This argument ignores
the neutral nature of the defamation tort. In Florida,
to establish defamation, Father Gallagher must “allege
and prove the defamatory statement was published, it
was false, the person who said it must have been acting
‘with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity,’
and Father Gallagher suffered actual damages as a
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result of the statement.” Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc. v.
Gallagher, 249 So. 3d 657, 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018), review denied, No. SC18-865, 2018 WL 4050485
(Fla. Aug. 23, 2018) (quoting Jews For Jesus, Inc. v.
Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)).
The Florida court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s case
deprived him of the opportunity to establish that his
employer defamed him in describing Father Gallagher’s reporting of certain criminal conduct undertaken against children. The employer accused Father
Gallagher of, e.g., making “unfounded allegations,”
“fabrications,” and “blatantly lying” about the charges
against Father Palimatton. Cert. Petition at 4-5. Arguments about those claims should be neutrally reviewed
in the trial court.
The trial court is the appropriate place for Respondent to contest the facts of this case, which ended
on a writ of prohibition. Respondent’s factual response
confirms the wisdom of a ruling from this Court allowing Petitioner and Respondent to participate in a lawsuit conducted according to the principles of Florida
tort law, which protects all plaintiffs from defamation,
whether by a religious or a non-religious actor.
This case is about one kind of harm to children.
Investigations and court decisions repeatedly demonstrate how thousands of children are endangered by all
types of abuse. See, e.g., In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018). Florida
law requires reporting child abuse to state authorities.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201(1)(c), 39.205(1).
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Defamation law should not be interpreted to discourage reporters of abuse by allowing them to be defamed
by their employers. It is a legal harm that can be reviewed by neutral legal principles.
II.

The Florida Court Mistakenly Relied on
this Court’s Ministerial Jurisprudence to
Dismiss the Lawsuit.

The Florida appeals court also suggested that this
case should be dismissed because Father Gallagher is
a minister for ministerial exception purposes. In resolving both the church autonomy and ecclesiastical
abstention “doctrines,” the court noted that such “doctrine”
“ ‘precludes courts from exercising jurisdiction
where an employment decision concerns a
member of the clergy or an employee in a ministerial position.’ ” Palm Beach, 249 So. 3d at
661 (quoting Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v.
Minagorri, 954 So. 2d 640, 641 (Fla. 3d DCA
2007)).
The appeals court then added:
Courts may not consider employment disputes between a religious organization and its
clergy because such matters necessarily involve questions of internal church discipline,
faith, and organization that are governed by
ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law. Whether
an individual is qualified to be a clergy member of a particular faith is a matter to be
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determined by the procedures and dictates of
that particular faith.
The interaction between a church and its pastor is an essential part of church government. . . . Thus, civil courts must abstain from
deciding ministerial employment disputes . . . ,
because such state intervention would excessively inhibit religious liberty. Palm Beach,
249 So. 3d at 661-62 (citing SE Conference
Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis, 862 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).
The court then cited this Court’s decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), as additional reason to dismiss the suit. The court wrongly concluded
that Father Gallagher’s dispute was not neutral, due
in part to his status as a minister. Even though Petitioner’s defamation case involved possible illegal activity that could be resolved under neutral legal
principles, the Florida courts dismissed it.
In Hosanna-Tabor, this Court “express[ed] no view
on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types
of suits, including actions by employees alleging
breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if
and when they arise.” 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
The time is now. Now is the time for this Court to
clarify that religious freedom, including the ministerial exception, does not absolutely ban tortious conduct
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lawsuits. Defamation cases, and other tort lawsuits,
should be resolved according to neutral principles of
law.
During this Court’s oral argument in HosannaTabor, Justice Sotomayor anticipated cases like Petitioner’s, where important societal interests other than
the purely internal, ecclesial relationship between a
church and its ministers are at stake. The Justice
asked in particular about teachers who are fired for reporting sexual abuse to the government. Under the
Florida court’s reasoning in Petitioner’s case, such lawsuits would be absolutely barred by religious freedom.
Justice Sotomayor anticipated the serious problems
with that outcome, asking, “[r]egardless of whether it’s
a religious belief or not, doesn’t society have a right at
some point to say certain conduct is unacceptable, even
if religious . . . ? And once we say that’s unacceptable,
can and why shouldn’t we protect the people who are
doing what the law requires, i.e. reporting it?” Transcript of Oral Argument at *5, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 4593953 (U.S.) [hereinafter Hosanna-Tabor Oral Arg.]. See also Ballaban v.
Bloomington Jewish Cmty., Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329, 339
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (struggling with the ministerial exception analysis in a rabbi’s case because the “United
States Supreme Court has not determined the applicability of the ministerial exception where a minister’s
employment was terminated or otherwise impacted for
reporting or attempting to report child abuse or neglect”).
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This Court should protect the people like Petitioner who do what the law requires. Florida law requires reporting child abuse to state authorities. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201(1)(c), 39.205(1). This
Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment
does not protect criminal conduct or fraud. See, e.g.,
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“reject[ing] the claim
that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice”); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003)
(noting, “when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the
listener, the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud
claim”); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S.
147, 164 (1939) (indicating that “[f ]rauds,” including
“fraudulent appeals . . . made in the name of charity
and religion,” may be “denounced as offenses and punished by law”). Petitioner asks this Court to clarify
that, consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the
First Amendment in other doctrinal areas, religious
freedom and the ministerial exception do not ban tortious conduct lawsuits when important societal interests are at stake. Those cases can be resolved according
to neutral principles of law.
In response to Justice Sotomayor’s important
question, even counsel for Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran
Church and School acknowledged that the ministerial
exception should not be absolute: “if you want to carve
out an exception for cases like child abuse where the
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government’s interest is in protecting the child, not an
interest in protecting the minister, when you get such
a case, we think you could carve out that exception.”
Hosanna-Tabor Oral Arg. at *6. Counsel then provided
the “theoretical framework” for the exception requested by Justice Sotomayor:
First, you have to identify the government’s
interest in regulation. If the government’s interest is in protecting ministers from discrimination, we are squarely within the heart of
the ministerial exception. If the government’s
interest is something quite different from
that, like protecting the children, then you can
assess whether that government interest is
sufficiently compelling to justify interfering
with the relationship between the church and
its ministers. But the government’s interest is
at its nadir when the claim is we want to protect these ministers as such, we want to tell
the churches what criteria they should apply
for – for selecting and removing ministers.
Id. at *6-7. Amicus respectfully asks this Court to pursue that framework here, in a case that has nothing to
do with Father Gallagher’s qualifications for ministry
and everything to do with respecting the government’s
profound interests in protecting children.
Such a balanced and non-absolute approach to the
ministerial exception would be consistent with this
Court’s Religion Clause precedents, which have never
identified religious freedom rights as absolute when
important governmental and third-party interests are
at stake. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
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U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that religious accommodations must take account of third-party interests);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (same);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-22 (2005) (indicating that prisoners’ demands under RLUIPA must
be weighed against the “burden a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries” and “measured so that [they do] not override other significant
interests”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (stating that religious accommodations must consider interests of third-party employees).
This Court has always weighed the proposed actions of First Amendment rights holders against potential harm to third parties because “[a]t some point,
accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into
‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145
(1987)). Moreover, Free Exercise values are equally at
stake in recognizing that religious employers do not
enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability. Religious
freedom and the ministerial exception must not be interpreted inconsistently with this Court’s Free Exercise precedents, which require all citizens, even
religious ones, to obey neutral laws of general applicability. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court has never granted
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absolute First Amendment immunity from tort liability to a church for violation of a neutral, generally applicable law. Its doctrine is squarely to the contrary. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990);
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-32 (1993); Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“express[ing] no view on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of suits, including actions by
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers”).
Moreover, this Court has never extended absolute
immunity to religious organizations in cases that involve illegal conduct or third-party harm and that may
be resolved through “neutral principles of law.” Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. Neither should the courts of Florida or any other courts extend such immunity to
religious organizations.
On behalf of Petitioner Father John Gallagher,
Amicus respectfully asks this Court to clarify that his
employers do not enjoy absolute immunity for his defamation. Father Gallagher wants his day in trial court,
and the opportunity to win or lose his case there based
on neutral principles of law. We ask you to give him
that opportunity.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
Whether church autonomy, the ecclesiastical abstention rule and the ministerial exception of the First
Amendment bar tort lawsuits is an important issue to
ministers like Petitioner, whose lawsuit ended on a
writ of prohibition without any consideration of his duties to obey the law and protect innocent children.
For these reasons, the petition for certiorari
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
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